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LET' S STOP HELPING THE POOR
Donald Feldstein
Federation of Jewish Philanthropies of New York
The time has come in America to stop trying to help the poor.
These efforts have resulted in poor services, inadequate levels
of aid, stigma to the recipients, creation of a permanent welfare
class, cheating, and the exacerbation of divisiveness in America
between classes and ethnic groups. In large part, these negative
effects are due to the attempt to target or pinpoint aid for the
poor alone; but the poor can only be helped in the context of
programs for all Americans.
The selective forms of servicing the poor, so predominant in
the United States, are reminiscent of a newspaper story, read as
a child. It happened in one of those towns in which fire depart-
ment services were on a subscription basis. As one non-subscribed
house began to burn, the firemen gathered around, hoses poised at
neighboring buildings whose owners were subscribers, ready to swing
into action if these buildings caught fire, but allowing the non-
subscribed building to burn down.
By and large, this kind of arrangement no longer exists. We
seem to have accepted the proposition that fire protection is a
basic social utility, necessar to the orderly functioning of soc-
iety-, and necessarily available to all.
But if this tradition were not so strong, one could conceive
of a local legislator pointing out that perhaps 70' of the cost of
running the fire department goes to 20" of the community, because
in one area factory owners have not built adequately safe plants.
Perhaps factory owners should pa- for fire service. Or this mythi-
cal legislator might argue in the name of equity and social justice
that 'he rich should pay a fairer share for tieir fire services;
while the firemen might come on call to put out a fire, perhaps
the owners of various properties should be billed based on their
abilit- to pav. Or legislation could be introduced building in
certain incentives, so that houses or factories which had anti-
"ire features wou]h1 be chargeC less, and those without safet ,
features would le charged an extra premium if they had a fire.
V ere we no- used to the concept of fire services beinz a basic
l!tilit"- available 'o all, without specific or means tested cost,
l iese suggestions could be seen as forward looking ideas to pro-
mote equit- and safety.
Pu-, of course, there would be 'laws in such "reforms".
There would be arguments and counter-arguments about who is really
to blame for high fire rates in the glhetto. A bureaucrac would
have to be created to dev.'elop the financial test under which peo-
ple would pay differential fees for fire service. Inspectors
Would hlave to certif- the level of fire safet - in each dwelling.
'\notier group of inspectors would have to police the system to see
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that bribery and corruption were checked. The thrust of fire pre-
vention would be on who belonged in what category, rather than on
making all of society less fireprone. Fundamental cleavages would
begin to arise between those who were below the paying line, get-
ting a free service, and those who were above the line, paying for
fire service. Those who paid, particularly those who were just a
little bit above the level of the nonpayers, would inevitably feel
resentful and put upon, and point up to any number of cases of
cheating; by some other standard, they would be more eligible for
the free service than a number of people who were now getting the
free service.
Happily, no such move seems to be under way in the area of
fire services. Society seems to be committed to the idea of fire
service as a fundamental utility available to all, for a number of
reasons:
1. Particularly in the crowded cities, there is almost no
such thing as a fire which affects only the owner of a given pro-
perty, and the recognition of interdependence forces us to gener-
alize the service.
2. Most people are aware of the fact that there is a tax sys-
tem which, however well or poorly, does attempt to provide the equi-
ty in financing, so that the rich pay more and the poor less for
municipal services, including fire.
3. There is an unspoken decision by society that in the area
of fire, as in other disaster situations, we are fundamentally one
society, each dedicated to helping the other and responsible for
one another, and that the traditional considerations of the market-
place do not apply.
But these same principles apply in other areas of human ser-
vices as well. Not too long ago it appeared that the expansion of
such universal social utilities as fire services, available to all,
was an inevitable trend. From free high school we would go to free
public education, at least through two years of community college;
from Social Security we would go to Medicare, to health care for
all. Even in that most troublesome area of income maintenance, we
might move toward universal family allowances, as exist in other
developed societies.
This trend seems to have been reversed, first with the War on
Poverty, and most significantly since 1969. There was a clear
Nixon philosophy continued by the Ford administration. It has be-
come a part of domestic social planning to such an extent that even
liberal thinkers in social policy have been carried in its wake.
The Nixon social programs were consistently and fundamentally
selective in their approach. They were based on a concept of Amer-
ican society which sees the market ideally taking care of every-
body, but provides for certain kinds of special charitable pro-
grams for the casualties of the market society. This approach is
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the ver-y opposite of the creation of broad, universal social util-
ities, replacing the market in key areas of human need.
A selective social welfare program is a means tested pro-
gram, any program in which the eligibility for the program, or the
cost of participation in the program, is based on a determination
of a given individual's ability to pay. Public welfare is, of
course, the prime example, but it is true of food stamps, housing
subsidies, Medicaid, sliding scale child welfare and day care pro-
grams, and fees set by a voluntary counseling service. A univer-
sal service is a service available to every:one, or to a certain
class or category- of people withoui individual testing of finan-
cial means. Thus the Social Security program's benefits are avail-
atle only to people who have reached a certain age and have re-
tired, but no individual has to prove his financial eligibility.
Other examples of universal programs are Medicare, Unemployment In-
surance, fire services, public parks, some veteran's benefits,
police services and the public school system.
One can understand w.- a Nixon or a Ford -ould not support
such programs. Committed to the market society, they still be-
lieve that the market is the mechanism and the vehicle for all
good things, and social welfare's only function is to pick up the
casualties of the market. This is true in the area of health care
where Nixon proposed a dual sy-stem, one for the employed and one
for the unemployed. It was the Nixon approach in the proposed Fam-
ily Assistance Plan, which was a means tested program. It is how
Nixon approachee child care, espousing .,elfare day care, but veto-
ing a more general child care program in the Mondale Bill.
But this article seeks to explore why even liberal policy
makers and planners have been carried along by the selective wave.
Daniel Mo'nihan once fought for children's allowances (universal)
as a sounder answer to poverty in America than a negative income
tax. The former would provide a monthly% check to ever- child in
America; the l-'tter would give money to the poor. But in a more
recent book, Mo--nihan refers to the Nixon Family Assistance Plan
(which was a kind of negative income tax) almost interchangeably
with the term famil,- allowances. Other planners espouse special
rbograms for the poor and disadvantageO as obviously the most hu-
mane aiproach.
Nixon's was a consistent and defensible philosophy, but why
have liberal and leftist social policy people begun to support
selective programs? Why have they gone along with the Nixon cul-
ture? The reasons are several:
1. There is a realization that money is short, and choices do
need to be made. Universal programs cost more money. To the ex-
tent that the- are available to all, they are being used by people
who could pay their own way. People with large bank accounts may
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be eligible for Social Security or Unemployment Insurance. Bene-
fits are being "wasted" on them. Thus, the natural answer to the
problem of limited resources would seem to be to pinpoint or limit
the service to the eligible poor, or to offer the service to every.
one, but to make those who are able pay for the service on a slid-
ing scale.
2. From a certain perspective, a selective approach seems
fairer, no matter how large the pie, so long as it is not infi-
nite. Rawls' A Theory of Justice and other writings have given
credence to a sense of equity which is based on a reparations ap-
proach. If we take a simplistic view of the "spaceship earth"
concept, rather than assume an ever-expanding universe, redistri-
bution means taking from the rich and giving to the poor. If
we assume continued economic growth, we can give the poor more
of that growth while the rich expand more slowly. But we seem to
be operating on the belief in a static pool of wealth. This lends
itself to selective social welfare programs to redress wrongs.
Give the benefits to the poor!
3. The "we"/"they" separation of society which was once seen
as stigmatizing the poor is seized upon by some thinkers now as a
positive. They seek to develop a special pride and identity for
the poor.
The Welfare Rights Organization, so vocal in the late 601s,
was an example of this trend. Membership was open only to the poor.
It claimed to seek to swamp the welfare system by organizing the
poor to demand their full rights. When the welfare system be-
came so weighted down with demands, fair hearings, etc., it would
be simpler for the establishment to institute a guaranteed mini-
mum income. An example was the spurt in demands for special
grants for winter clothing and other items (to which the poor
were previously unaware they were entitled) in New York City.
When the establishment did indeed crack, and offered a flat grant
automatically to all welfare recipients, the Welfare Rights Or-
ganization objected. It objected, not only because the flat
grants were too low, a legitimate objection, but by now W.R.O.
liked the idea of having clients get benefits through their own
efforts. W.R.O. objected to guaranteed grants for all as a tactic
to break up Ihe W.R.O.! Thus do means and ends get reversed. A
number of previously powerless people now have an investment in
specialized and selective programs for the poor, community elec-
tions in which only the poor ma'. vote, etc. It has become their
power base. Other sincere social thinkers see selectivity as the
only way to make maximum feasible participation a reality, to give
the poor clout.
4. Given the factors mentioned above, given the concern for
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the poor and disadvantaged, liberals are now won over to selective
programs by technology. If it is now possible to have a computer-
ized family assistance plan, if people can have their eligibility
checked in a non-stigmatizing and non-degrading way, then this takes
a major objection out of selective programs, and sociely can afford
to go ahead with them.
For instance, Nixon proposed a dual health plan, one for the
employed and one for the unemployed and poor. But if all use the
same services, and simply insert a card in a machine on their way
in or out, and this card instructs the machine whom to bill for
how much, then what harm is there is a means tested program? Cer-
tainly it would be cheaper than free health care for all, and it
would not penalize the poor. Similarly, a negative income tax is
not stigmatizing. Everyone fills out a tax form. Some would then
give and some would get. Social planners have become enamored with
the apparent simplicity and cleanliness of such schemes. Some even
refer to a negative income tax as a universal program, which it
is not.
Thus, we have a strange coalition: Rightists who believe in
the market, with social welfare only as a residual arm of society,
and leftists who believe in "Poor Power", or in getting the most
dollars most quickly to the poor. Together, they have developed
a strong thrust for selective social services and against the cre-
ation of new universal social services.
Let us examine the reasons for supporting selectivity in
order:
1. Money is short.
There is no denying that universal programs do cost a lot more
than selective programs, but not quite as much as would appear at
fi7ust blush. Selective programs inevitably waste large percentages
of the money expended in administration, investigations, and bur-
eaucracy. As soon as benefits depend on each individual's means,
operational costs multiply. (And cheating has to be expected in
spite of this multiplication.) Consider the administrative costs
in operating the public welfare programs around the United States,
as opposed to those in the Social Security system. The former is
weighted down by eligibilit- rules, investigations, and changes in
status; the latter is run by a single computer system and local
offices to answer questions.
There are also ways to cut the cost of universal programs.
Counting the income received from universal programs, such as the
present Social Security payments, or proposed family allowance
payments, as part of taxable income would result in recovering
part of the expenditures which are "wasted" on the rich. It ma,
sound foolish to give ever%-one money, and then to take some of' it
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back from the rich. But the evidence is that this would be simpler,
administratively more efficient, and fairer than deciding in ad-
vance how much to give whom.
Money could also be saved if a universal program, such as a
children's allowance, replaced current regressive allowances. Un-
der a children's allowance, families would receive a monthly check,
say $75 for each child in the family. If this were part of tax-
able income, the poor would keep it all, and others would pay back
varying amounts, more as they were more wealthy. The current $750
deduction for dependents in the income tax system works in reverse.
The poor (who pay no tax) get no benefit. The family in a 20% tax
bracket actually gets $150. The family in a 70% tax bracket ac-
tually gets over $500.* Ending these regressive deductions which
cost the treasury billions of dollars each year would help to off-
set the higher costs of replacing them with universal programs.
Economists have also become more aware of social costs. The
cost of manufacturing a product needs to include not only the cost
to the manufacturer, but the cost to society of cleaning a polluted
stream, building a road to a factory, even the cost of cleaning
curtains in homes near a smoky factory. Similarly, it's hard to
calculate the real cost of selective vs. universal programs. If
universal programs cut down the division in society, alienation,
the "we"/"they" feelings, perhaps even crime, how does one com-
pare?
Universal programs do cost more, but not as much more as some
would claim, nor more than any developed country can afford. Al-
most all developed countries have a variety of such services, in
health, vocational retraining, income maintenance, day care. On-
ly the United States seems unable to offer them.
2. Equity.
There is no way to discuss equity for the p,,or and disadvan-
taged in a political arrangement where the poor can't win. If
they don't have the clout to develop, expand and improve programs,
the kind of clout that is possible by universalizing programs so
everyone has a stake in them, then there is no equity. It is only
the universal programs that have the legislative and political sup-
port to be maintained, improved and expanded, even while selective
programs are cut with impunity against the will of the poor. We
need only examine the improvement in benefits in Social Security
over the past years. In spite of the fact that it is financed
by a heavy and regressive tax, there has been no great public out-
cry against tax increases, because everybody feels he will benefit.
On the other hand, whenever times get hard and money gets tight,
the programs for the poor suffer, just as public welfare has suf-
fered in the years since 1969. Thus, in the long run, it is doubtful
A small non-regressive deduction has now been added to the tax
system. -152-
that the poor get more by pinpointing money in programs at them.
Noble sentiments, such as "plans for universal day care should
proceed only when high quality care has been atiained for those who
lack the resources to make other arrangements", are really neither
sound nor noble. We will attain high quality day care for those
who lack resources only when plans for universal day care proceed.
This whole concept of equity seems to be based on a vulgar
environmentalist-neo-Malthusian interpretation of the reality that
the goods of society are ultimately limited. Thus, the only is-
sue becomes how the pie is divided. Instead, the pie can and must
grow, albeit in different and less polluting ways. It is precise-
ly in times of economic growth that the poor improve their status
disproportionately, and begin to bridge the gap between themselves
and the well-to-do. When times get hard, when there is no econom-
ic growth, the poor tend to suffer more, in spite of all schemes
for providing more equity.
"It is criminal to expect the Third World to remain impov-
erished, foolish to expect the rich to share significantly with
the poor, and silly to believe the poor will become strong enough
to grasp from the prosperous by force. But given continued eco-
nomic growth, the next century will see the world-wide abolition
of historical poverty.... "-".As with the Third World, so with the
United States. In the expanding society of the 60's while all grew
wealthier, the poor and Blacks increased their share of the wealth
proportionately more. Not so in the 70's.
Universal programs give the middle class something. Under
those conditions, it will tend not to object if they give the
poor more. But take away from the middle class what it has, make
it pay for a program for which it is ineligible, as selective
programs try to, and it will fight the program, limit it, or
make it ugly.
Equity is also unreal in programs which do not cover the tar-
get population. We often read about ineligibles on welfare, but
a vast number of those eligible never get public assistance nor
benefit from any selective program. Selective programs tend to
play it close to the vest -- one does not see signs in the sub-
way inviting a visit to your friendly welfare center to see if you
are eligible. Money allocated for these programs assumes less
than full participation. In spite of "alerts", "outreach", and
Welfare Rights, a significant percentage of eligibles either don't
know about programs, are too ashamed to apply, can't negotiate the
bureaucratic maze, or are unfairly found ineligible and don't
appeal. There's no equity in programs which inevitably reach on-
ly the aggressive poor.
1. Sidney Levenstein, "Day Care: Gold Coin or Brass Check?", Social
Work, Vol. 17, Y5, 9/72.
2. B. Bruce-Briggs, "Against the Neo-Malthusians", Commentary,
July 1974, p. 26.
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3. "We" versus "They"
The idea that developing "poor consciousness", like "Black
consciousness", is the road to helping the poor, is particularly
patronizing. The late Richard Titmuss pointed out that the dis-
mally poor turnout in poverty board elections under OEO was not a
question of poor organization or communication so much as it was
a rejection by the vast majority of the poor of a system in which
they had to declare themselves to be poor to be eligible to vote.
The very idea that it is no longer stigmatizing to be seen as poor
is romantic nonsense. Anyone familiar with the poor knows that
most of the poor believe poor is bad. Ask those who turn in food
stamp vouchers at the supermarket and find the checkout clerks
evaluating their choices of purchases. Organization of the poor
is a no-win situation, because the best leadership often loses
eligibility in the club, by earning money. "Poor pride" is the
other side of F. Scott Fitzgerald's mistaken notion that the very
rich are different from you and me; it is like the "culture of
poverty" writers who romanticize and blame the poor for their pov-
erty all in one chapter. Singling out the poor as the recipient
of programs, or as the single focus of organization, is self de-
feating. Poor people should be part of organizations and recipi-
ents of services in coalition with others to achieve their needs.
4. Technology
Finally, we come to the most persuasive argument of all. Peo-
ple who do not want the poor to be stigmatized, do not want them
to have second class service, believe that the new kind of selective
programs are not selective in the old sense. Everyone will fill
out the same income tax form; under the Family Assistance Plan,
or other negative income tax plans, the poor would have a net gain
from the government while others would pay in.
Everyone could take advantage of precisely the same health
services, argued some British policymakers in the 60's in a simi-
lar dispute. It's just that on the way out each person would have
his credit card punched at the desk. Those who were able to pay,
based on what the card indicated, would then receive a bill; the
others would not. No difference in service, no stigma to the cli-
ent, no problem in this modern age of making our welfare dollar
go further by selecting out those who really need it. In a classic
piece in the New Statesman, Titmuss explained how selective pro-
grams retain thl quality of selective programs no matter how they
are structured. Tske the example of the health "credit card" to
save money, in a system which had previously offered free univer-
sal health care for all citizens. Would the person who had to
pay for health care because of his income still have to pay if
the medical care was based on an accident caused by someone else?
Suppose he were a veteran dealing with an injury received in war-
time? Who would pay for an illness which was picked up in a
3. "Universal & Selective Social- Services", New Statesman, 9/15/67.
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hospital, of which there are more than a few? Such questions could
go on and on, and force a reintroduction of a whole variety of
health care systems, examining boards, screening devices, standards
for what constitutes liability, service connected injuries, work-
men's compensation cases, injuries inflicted by others.
There appears to be no way in which a selective system can
avoid having bureaucrats make all sorts of moral judgments and
evaluations of people's day-to-day lives, no matter how much of
the mechanism is handled by a computer. Further, there is the
problem of how eligibility and scales are to be determined for this
credit card. There are inherent problems in any selective system,
computerized or no. Let us assume that "A" and "B" each earned
$10,000 each year for ten years. "A" spent all his income, while
"B" managed to save $2,000 a year. Now both lose their jobs and
start collecting under the Family Assistance Plan, or receive a
health card. Is it fair that "B" should receive the same benefit
as "A", since she has $20,000 in the bank? Would it be fair if
"B" did not receive the same benefit as "A", and was penalized for
her thrift? But suppose "B" had $100,000 in the bank, or an in-
heritance, or a piece of property? Should she still get welfare?
All of these value questions are ones that have to be dealt with
in the organization of any selective program, computerized or not.
Now one may argue that these same questions arise in the de-
velopment of an income tax system, and are therefore no more oner-
ous in figuring eligibility for a welfare program. But there is
a difference. When a program is specifically set up to benefit
the poor, rather than for all society, it invites constant evalu-
ation of who is really deserving and who is not, and who is cheat-
ing the taxpayer of his hard-earned money. To the extent that we
can separate the input, or financing, end of a program from the
output, or program end, we can get a clearer and calmer look at
financing and a cleaner program. In fact, the various gimmicks
of selectivity-eligibility, sliding scales, negative income tax,
may have even deflected America from one of the main social is-
sties which needs to be handled, reform of the tax structure. The
conJusion between the input or financing equit- and output or ser-
vice equity diffuses our efforts. We would be better served bv
working to make the tax sliucture more progressive and more equi-
table, rather than trying to create financial equity by making
only some people eligible for programs.
The technocrats who foresee a stigma-free selectivity con-
sistently ignore nitty-grittv questions of administration. They
write about a neat and simple FAP, just like making out one's in-
come !ax form. Volumes have been written on negative income tax;
!here is still no explanation of how it could be simply administered.
In fact, an FAP type program would have to be welfare by another
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name. The poor can't operate on a single once-a-year check
based on their earnings of the previous year. When their earnings
go up, it is not likely that they will have money to refund; when
their earnings go down, they cannot wait for assistance. There
will be a constant parade of people with eligibility claims and
changes, and judgments will have to be made on them in a tradi-
tional welfare atmosphere of resentment and fears of cheating, be-
cause this is seen as a charitable type of program. In other words,
negative income tax is really only a nationalized public assis-
tance program. There will be cheating, and there will be scandals
about the cheating, and stereotypes about the poor will be main-
tained and enhanced. When the middle class is squeezed, the pro-
gram will be curtailed, because programs for the poor inevitably
become poor programs.
There are other problems with selective welfare programs.
Among the worst features of selective programs is the creation of
a welfare class, a continuing group for whom welfare is a way of
life, a group which is unique, at least in size, to America, be-
cause America does not have the other institutional and universal
programs which other developed societies have to minimize welfare --
children's allowances, full employment programs, universal free
health care, etc. For this group, leaving welfare presents prob-
lems of loss of benefits, loss of eligibility for a variety of
selective programs.
This is the "notch" problem. At one point, Nixon's FAP was
almost passed, but had to be sent back for revision, due to the
notches. As people earn or are given more money, they hit notches,
or points of ineligibility for any one of the plethora of
selective programs -- low cost housing, food stamps, Me(licaid,
etc. So that by getting more, people may be worse off, and cer-
tainly this is a disincentive to work. Economists can design
convoluted programs around the notches, but good sense cries out
for a simpler, cleaner way out of the welfare mess.
Maintaining incentives to work constantly frustrates humane
approaches to welfare in selective programs. So long as we main-
tain a selective approach, the onerous principle of less eligi-
bility is inevitable. That is, the most somebody should make on
welfare ought to be less or very close to the least anyone could
make working. This sounds cruel, but in a market economy where
work incentive is based on money, there's no way out of the dilem-
ma. The only hope is to do as other countries have done, to take
some universal system of payment such as family allowances, and/or
services, and to separate it from the market, which cannot relate
to family size or need. As Eveline Burns has written:
"This effort to build incentives into the payment system
greatly complicates administration, especially when it is recalled
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that for many of the poverty group income is highly flucu-
ating and highly unpredictable. Finally, we still do not
know much about the incentive effect of different rates of
taxation on the desire to work...
"It is for these reasons that I question in principle
the desirability of trying to build incentive devices into
our income security programs, sad though this would be for
economists who are having such fun today playing with models
and formulae. Why do we not separate the system for making
antipoverty payments from the system which determines how
much of total received income people should return to their
government in the form of taxes? ....
"...Why not pay everyone a demogrant, or national divi-
dend, and let each individual earn as much or as little as
he wishes and at the end of the -ear provide for a reckoning
with government through the income tax sy:stem? This would
enable us to make much more effective use of our tax system
as the instrument for determining, in the light of all con-
siderations and taking all incomes into account, how much of
their income people should devote to the support of all our
nublic services (including defense). In such a tax system,
all income, including publicly provided income, would in
principle be liable to tax, although it would probably be
decided that, as now, incomen below a certain level would
be immune from taxation...."
This is not the place to argue in detail the complex issue
of the relative merits of family allowances versus negative in-
come taxes. But the point is that it is the selective programs
which have the strong disincentives to work in them, a condition
universal demogrants, children's allowances, or universally avail-
able programs would tend to correct.
There are more problems with selectivity. Selective services
must eilher assume a second-rate quality or be unfair to the non-
poor. A detached street worker program for middle and upper class
delinquents was set up in one community in the 1950's. Some offi-
cials objected because the parents of these children could afford
psychiatric services -- why should the community support a street
worker? Well, if psychiatric sessions are the treatment of choice,
the poor should get them, too. But if street work is particularly
effective with delinquent youth, why should the rich be deprived
of this service? And this is one of the most important reasons to
stop helping the poor -- the need to build one society in America.
4. Eveline Burns, "The American System of Social Security: Agen-
da for the 1970's", Social Economics for the 1970's, e('. by
George F. Rohlich, Dunellen, 1970, pp. 75-7C.
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Beyond the needs of ethnic pride and pluralism, the United
States is splintered badly at this time. There is a lack of a cen-
tral ideelogical core with which we all identify as Americans --
the mutual consent which provides the glue for a society. Liberals
recognize this when others make law and order speeches about crime.
Of course we need better police services, but ultimately no society
can exist if it depends on constant policing to prevent law break-
ing. Society can exist only by common consent around certain norms
of behavior with police available to deal with the deviant from those
norms. While we accept this idea on crime, we may have been affect-
ed by the law and order approach in other social policy areas. The
Nadar and consumerist approach to bad institutions tends to be to
call for better policing of them. But it would be more effective
to create social institutions in which we all can feel part, in
which we all can feel pride. We need to undivide America from the
war between the hardhats and the poor. One way of doing that is
through the institution of more universal social services. Per-
haps the most troublesome feature of any selective program is its
inherent divisiveness. Day care, medical care, income payments,
whatever, no matter how generous the level, creates an inevitable
war between those above and those below the eligibility line. It
is this aspect which has compounded the social cost of selectivity
to America. The war between Blacks and White ethnics, between
low middle income hardhats and the poor, is in part due to the se-
lective approach to social welfare programs. The bitter street
wisdom that to get good medical care, or housing, or whatever, you
need to be very rich or very poor, is not all wrong. This com-
pounds the reluctance to serve the poor even while it denies the
needs of the people in between.
It need not be so. The development of new universal programs
is possible, but social policy planners have to reawaken to the
importance of this as an issue. Can we afford the high cost in-
volved? Poorer countries than the United States manage more uni-
versal programs. Certainly it must be possible for the United
States to devote some piece of its growth to such institutions.
The remarkable thing is that the population will pay for such pro-
grams in spite of their great costs, because everyone benefits.
The example cited about Social Security improvements should be
borne in mind. The basic principle is that, as the pie expands
for everyone, people are more generous; as it contracts, they are
more miserly.
Universal services are not a panacea. They can become se-
lective, de facto. In some cases, the rich "cream" or monopolize
the service. They are more sophisticatgd about access, and can ef-
fectively deny the service to the poor. Or service can be left
to the poor. We need only look at what is happening to the public
5. For a fuller discussion of this, see Alfred J. Kahn, Social
Policy & Social Services, pp. 78-83.
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schools in the cities. We see that a formally universal program
becomes selective, if poor and Black children are the only ones in
the public schools, and all others go to private schools. This
has to be guarded against. What has happened in some community
colleges shows that it can be. Where the community college is
seen as a dumping ground for the inept and poor, morale is low,
the graduates do not think well of themselves, and the community
college as a social utility is less meaningful. In the parts of
the country where the free community college is supported, where
excellent faculty are hired to run first-rate programs, rich and
poor mix with a sense of pride, and this has been a factor in what
has been called the "blueing of America". Obviously, structure
and form are crucial to whether a social utility functions as
such. Cash programs, for instance, are less easily "creamed" than
sophisticated service programs. While there are no guarantees, it
is only with universal services that we have a chance for building
the institutions of a united America.
There is one final argument that the liberals who support
selectivity raise. They know that ultimately, universal programs
would be better but, they claim, we have to take what we can get.
When there is the possibility of an FAP, or a means tested health
care plan, or an SSI (Supplemental Security Income), we had better
take it as better than nothing. This approach ignores the way pol-
icy develops in America. In the United States we tend toward in-
cremental changes. That is, programs are continued and built on
the superstructure that is originally founded. We had better give
more attention to basic forms and less to specific benefits.
Some people now think that, for all its benefits, it may have
been a mistake to support Medicaid with its third-party vendor pay-
ments, built-in corruption, and escalation of health costs. Even
ifi l meant waiting for another year or two for a better plan, it
might have been worth the effort, because all improvements in Medi-
caid are still based on a basic poor organizing principle. One
is reluctant to claim that such arguments outweigh the benefits of
Medicaid, but the idea is worth considering. It is sometimes bet-
ter in the long run to compromise on benefits for the sake of a
better system.
For instance, in 19-2 George McGovern called for universal
demogrants of $4,000 per family of four. He was frightened off
this proposal by the astronomical cost estimates. But he was
wedded to the $4,000 figure, so he shifted ground to support of
a $4,000 FAP instead of Nixon's $2,400 FAP. Finally, we got
neither. If we had gotten a $4,000 FAP, it might have been cut
to $2,400 by now because of a tax revolt. But if McGovern, and
liberals generally, had stuck to the demogrant principle, even if
the figure were cut to $2,000, or set up to cover only children,
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and such a plan had passed Congress, it could only improve, as
Social Security does, because of the nature of the broad consti-
tuency served.
Our position is that universal concepts and programs are not
only superior to selective social services -- we believe they may
be at least as marketable. The time has come for social planners
to make the effort, to make universalism a live issue again, to
lay the groundwork for the kinds of programs in America which can
truly bring us together.
Universal programs are not so wild a dream. We have houses
on fire in the United States today. Any one may cause our house
to burn down. We need a fire department committed to fighting all
fires, wherever they arise, supported by all of us, to the extent
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